Financial services
SR 11-7 was written for models. Your agents are the operators.
Model risk management assumed a model produces an output a person acts on. An agent produces the action. Validation, governance and ongoing monitoring still apply — but the record has to come from something that is not the agent, and it has to survive an examiner asking what happened on a Tuesday in March.
Three questions an examiner asks that a dashboard cannot answer.
Each one is a record question, not a monitoring question. Detection tells you something looked wrong. An examination asks you to prove what actually happened, to someone who does not take your word for it.
Requester identity propagates into every event. No ambient authority, no service account standing in for a person. The delegation chain travels with the record, including causal depth and parent event.
Policies are version-controlled Rego with an audit-logged approval workflow. The policy version hash is on the event, so the rule that actually evaluated is recoverable, not reconstructed.
Every event is Ed25519-signed and SHA-256 hash-chained. Verification runs offline against a trust anchor frozen at enrollment. Your examiner does not need a Behavry account, or our cooperation.
Surface discovery cross-references IdP apps, SaaS admin APIs and endpoint signatures through a four-state model — Licensed, Enabled, Active, Governed — so the gap between what is running and what is authorized is a number, not a guess.
Mapped to the rules you are actually examined against.
Each control below is backed by shipped enforcement, not a roadmap entry. Coverage is stated honestly: full where the control is satisfied by shipped capability, partial where Behavry supplies evidence but the obligation extends beyond what any platform can discharge for you.
| Regime | Section | Control | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| OCC SR 11-7 | §IV.A | Model Validation | Full |
| OCC SR 11-7 | §IV.B | Model Governance | Full |
| OCC SR 11-7 | §IV.C | Ongoing Model Risk Monitoring | Full |
| NYDFS Part 500 | §500.7 | Access Privileges | Full |
| NYDFS Part 500 | §500.6 | Audit Trail | Full |
| SEC Rule 206(4)-7 | §275.206(4)-7(a) | Written Compliance Policies | Full |
| SEC Rule 206(4)-7 | §275.206(4)-7(b) | Annual Review + Monitoring | Full |
| SEC Rule 206(4)-7 | AI governance | Employee Acceptable Use & Unauthorized Tool Blocking | Full |
| SEC Rule 204-2 | §275.204-2(a) | Record Creation | Full |
| SEC Rule 204-2 | §275.204-2(e) | Record Retention (5-year / 2-year accessible) | Full |
| SEC Reg S-P | §248.30 | NPI Safeguards — Policies & Procedures | Partial |
| SEC Fiduciary Duty | Duty of Care | Data Management & Model Bias Monitoring | Partial |
| SEC Fiduciary Duty | Duty of Loyalty | Form ADV & Client Disclosure Support | Partial |
What “mapped” means. Our shipped controls satisfy the named clauses today. It does not mean an independent auditor has certified them. Current status on the Trust Center. Full framework-to-control mapping with PDF export in the dashboard.
The three-pillar structure, applied to something that acts.
Behavioral baselining with Welford EWMA. Six-dimension anomaly scoring. Drift detection by Bray-Curtis divergence. Each agent carries a baseline tool manifest, and calls outside it are denied rather than noted.
Version-controlled Rego policy-as-code, a change-request workflow with audit-logged approve and reject, and a tamper-evident hash-chained record of what the policy did.
Real-time behavioral monitor over an event bus, six-dimension risk scoring, per-agent rate limits coupled to risk tier, and a fleet-wide kill switch when a model or an agent has to stop now.
Session-scoped tokens with risk-adaptive TTL, requester identity propagation instead of ambient authority, a restricted enforcement tier, and a per-agent kill switch.
Nonpublic personal information, stopped before the call executes.
Reg S-P and the GLBA Safeguards Rule do not care whether you detected the disclosure afterwards. Behavry evaluates the tool call before it runs, so NPI in an argument is a denial rather than an incident report.
33 DLP patterns including SSN with structure checks, account and routing numbers, and card numbers with Luhn validation. Critical-severity matches auto-block before policy evaluation.
Cross-session correlation catches NPI split across sequential requests — the exfiltration path that per-request scanning is structurally blind to.
Classify, redact with pseudonymization, BYOK envelope encryption, then retention purge with a decryption audit trail.
Configurable retention policies with TimescaleDB compression, plus SIEM export as an off-platform durable copy for the 5-year and 2-year-accessible obligation under 204-2(e).
Bring the agent your examiner would ask about.
We will walk your agent surfaces, show where the record gets produced, and hand you a signed Decision Trace you can verify yourself with no Behavry service in the loop.
Related: compliance · decision trace · trust center · integrations